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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
D. I-I. OLIVER,
Plaintiff-Respondent_,
Case No.

vs.

9658

CHARLES LEE MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING

Charles Lee Mitchell, appellant herein, petitions
the Supreme Court of the State of lJtah for a rehearing
in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 76 (e),
U.R.C.P.

APPELLANT URGES THE COURT TO
RECONSIDER, AND TO REVERSE, ITS
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT
WAIVED HIS CLAIM OF EXEMPTION AS
TO THE LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS HE
HELD.
1
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Ground for this petition is that the Opinion of the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in this case, filed
November 30, 1962, does not discuss the point on which
the appellant placed his greatest reliance.
The vital fact is: At the time said waiver was made
by appellant, the only issue was custody of appellant's
funds, whether they should be released to appellant or
retained under the restraint of a pre-judgment garnishment. There had been at that time no trial of the case
in chief. Execution, and waiver of execution, was not
then under consideration.
In support of this Petition, appellant relies on
the Statementof Facts at pages 4 to 8, and Point II of
his Argument at pages 13 to 19, in his original brief
on appeal herein. Appellant urges, however, that these
be considered in the light and context of his basic
premise, that the act of waiver made by the defendant
should be viewed in regard to the circumstances under
which it was performed.
The contention of appellant is, and has at all times
been, that his offer of waiver was merely a waiver of
his right to regain custody of all of his funds prior to
trial. His waiver was a waiver of his claim of right to
have a pre-judgment garnishment set aside. The waiver
was intended only to make a temporary compromise
of the issue of where his money should be held while
awaiting trial.
Appellant respectfully submits that if his original
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brief on appeal is viewed in this context, that his arguments n1ight well be more persuasive to the court.
Respectfully submitted,
K. SAMUEL KING
Attorney for Charles Lee Mitchell
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner
315 East Second South

Salt Lake City, Utah

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THE METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE
CITY, a corporation,
Plaintiff., Respondc_nt--a'fl4
Cross-Appellant·
vs.
Case No.
SAL T LAKE CITY, a Municipal
9660
Corporation; J. BRACKEN LEE;
L. C. ROMNEY; JOE L. CHRISTENSEN; CONRAD B. HARRISON; HERBERT F. SMART; and
THORPE B. ISAACSON,
Defendants., Appellants and
Cross-Respondents.

Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County
Hon. Merrill C. Faux, Judge

FISHER HARRIS
Tribune Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
E. RAY CHRISTENSEN
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Respondent, and Cross Appellant
HOMER HOLMGREN
City Attorney
NORMAN W. KETTNER
Assistant City Attorney
414 City & County Building
Salt Lake
City
11,
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney
LawUtah
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Attorneys for Library
Defendants
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant~ & Cross-Resnondents.

TABLJ1J OF CONTENTS
Page
STATElVIENT OF CASE .................................... 1
ARGUMENT-----------------------------------------------------------POINT I.
THE TENURE OF OFFICE OF MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
OF THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY HAS BEEN
AND NOW IS FIXED BY LEGISLATIVE
ENACTMENT AND HAS NOT BEEN DEFINED BY SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCES. -------------------------------------------------------------------POINT II.
THE 1957 AMENDMENT TO SECTION
73-8-52, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
CONSTRUED AS PLAINTIFF CONTENDS IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENT.-----------------------------------------------POINT III.
THE lVIAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY IS
NOT ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OR THE PERSON DESIGN . .L\.TED AS THE
APPOINTING POWER BY SECTION 738-20, U.C.A. 1953 -----------------------------------------------------POINT IV.
THE APPOINTMENT OF ISAACSON IS
INVALID. ----------------------------------------------------------···--·
CONCLUSION ··-·----····----·--·-----------··--··--··-·······-······

6

6

14

23

27
28

1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
CASES CITED
Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah, 237,
48 p .2d 530 ------------------------------------------------ 13, 19, 20

STATUTES CITED
Laws of Utah, 1935-Chapter 110........................ 2, 12
Laws of Utah, 1957-Chapter 159 ---------------------------- 12
U.C.A. 1953:
Sec. 10-6-14 ---------------------------------------------------------- 24
Sec. 73-8-3 ------------------------------------------------------------

2

Sec. 73-8-20 -------------------------------------------------- 2, 3, 23
Sec. 73-8-22 ---------------------------------------------------------- 16
Sec. 73-8-31 ---------------------------------------------------- 17, 19
Sec. 73-8-52 ---------------- 4, 7, 12, 14, 22, 23, 25, 26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

THE METROPOLITAN 'VATER
D I S T It I C T OF SALT LAKE
CITY, a corporation,
Plaintiff~ Respondent and
Cross- Appellant~
vs.

S A L T LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation; J. BRACKEN LEE;
L. C. ROMNEY; JOE L. CHRISTENSEN; CONRAD B. HARRISON; HERBERT F. SMART; and
THORPE B. ISAACSON,
Defendants~ Appellants and
Cross-Respondents.

Case No.
9660

Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief
STATEMENT OF CASE
The opening brief of appellants discussed only
the ruling of the trial court that the Mayor of Salt
Lake City was not the officer granting the power of
appointing directors of the plaintiff.
1
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Respondents answered this argument and then
discussed the question of tenure and the lack of vacancy
in the Board of Directors to which it is claimed that
defendant Isaacson was appointed. This latter argument was made in respondent's capacity as cross-appellant.
Defendants then filed a brief attempting to answer
this presentation. Hence it is now necessary for plaintiff to reply to the last brief of defendants and crossrespondents.
Although to some extent a repetition, in the hope
it will be useful, we state again the facts which have
resulted in these appeals and cross-appeals.
The Metropolitan \~Vater District Act was passed
by the Legislature of Utah (Chapter 110, Laws of
Utah 1935). The Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City and those of Orem, Provo, American Fork,
I~ehi and Pleasant Grove-Lindon came to existence
under that Act by mandate of the electors of those
cities and towns during that same year, each "a separate
and independent political corporate entity" (73-8-3,
U.C.A. 1953) vested with the broad and extensive
powers enumerated in the Act, and each, with the sole
exception of Pleasant Grove-Lindon, including the
area of only one city or Inunicipality.
The Act (73-8-20, U.C.A. 1953) provides that:
"All powers, privileges and duties vested in or
imposed upon any district, incorporated here2
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under shall be exercised and performed by and
through a board of directors ... "
As to the appointment of such directors that same
section provided :
"In the event that the district shall be organized to cmnprise the area of two or more
cities, the board of directors herein referred to
shall consist of at least one representative from
each municipality, the area of which shall lie
within the metropolitan water district. Such
representatives shall serve without compensation
from the district and shall be designated and
appointed by the chief executive officers of mu"7
nicipalities, respectively, with the consent and
approval of the governing bodies of the municipalities, respectively . . . "
That section of the Act closes with this:
"If any district shall include the area of only
one municipality then the board of directors shall
consist of such number as the governing body of
that municipality shall determine. All provisions
of this section appropriate shall apply to such
board."
Section 20 also contains this:
" ... immediately upon convening, such board
of directors shall elect from its membership a
chairman, a vice chairman and a secretary, who
shall serve for a period of two years, or until
sooner recalled or resigning~ or until his successor shall -be elected and qualified."
There is nothing else in the Metropolitan Water
District Act touching the term of office of any director

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or officer except the explicit provisions of Sec. 73-8-52,
U.C.A. 1953 (Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935):
"Recall and Resignation of Directors.
Every member of the board of directors of a
metropolitan water district formed hereunder
shall be subject to recall for or without cause by
the governing body of the municipality from
which such member shall be appointed, and any
member may resign from said board of.directors
and any office held by him in said district."
73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953 (Sec. 51 of the act of
1935.)

In 1935 the governing body of Salt Lake City
passed an ordinance which provided for a board of
seven and that the term of directors of the Metropolitan
Water District of Salt Lake City should be six years,
and from 1935 until June 19, 1941, appointments to
the board of directors were stated to be of that duration. But on the latter date the ordinance of 1935 was
repealed and an ordinance providing for a board of
five and purporting to fix the term at four years was
passed, and since then appointments to the District's
board of directors have been stated to be for that period.
Since 1941 no ordinance relating to the subject has
been passed.
All appointments have either been by the Mayor,
as both ordinances expressly provided, and have been
confirmed by the Board of Co1nmissioners of Salt Lake
City or they have been "reconnnended" by him and
have been agreed to by the other Commissioners. All
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

have been reappointments unless to fill vacancies due
to death or resignation.
The Legislature of 1957 a1nended Sec. 73-8-52
(Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935) to read as follows, striking
out the words "or without":
"Recall and Resignation of Directors.
Every mernber of the board of directors of a
metropolitan water district formed hereunder
shall be subject to recall for cause by the governing body of the municipality from which such
member shall be appointed, and any member may
resign from said board of directors and any office
held by him in said district." (Chap. 159, L.
1957).

On recommendation of the Mayor, Charles C.
Freed was appointed a member of the board of directors
of the District on June 18, 1958, for a term purporting
to terminate on June 19, 1961.
On August 3, 1961, the Mayor of Salt Lake City
nominated and with one dissenting vote the Board of
Commissioners agreed to the appointment of defendant
Isaacson to fill the vacancy said to existing by the ending of the term of office by Charles C. Freed.
At that time members of the Board of Commissioners other than the Mayor were advised by the Acting City Attorney that none of them had any right of
nomination, and to this they accedec\.
The "appointment" of defendant Isaacson was and
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is not recognized by the board of directors of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, because at
the time of the purported appointment there was no
vacancy on the District's board of directors and he was
not appointed by the proper authority.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TENURE OF OFFICE OF MElVIBERS
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE CITY HAS BEEN AND NOW IS
FIXED BY LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT
AND HAS NOT BEEN DEFINED BY SALT
LAKE CITY ORDINANCES.
The fundamental premises upon which plaintiff
bases its argument in favor of a tenure during good
behavior, and in consequence that the term of Charles
C. Freed had not expired, are simple and clear.
The Metropolitan Water District Act passed by
the Legislature of 1935 itself fixed the term of office
of directors of plaintiff. The term was at the will of
"the governing body of the municipality." The power
was given to the governing body of the municipality
to recall a director "for or without cause" (73-8-52,
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935), and there
was no way, by ordinance or otherwise, that the gov-
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erning body of the municipality could discard, avoid
or destroy or deprive itself of that power which it alone
could exercise, a power granted the governing body of
the Inunicipality by the explicit and unambiguous
language ·of the Legislature. Can anyone suggest any
language Inore definite and certain or more obvious to
the purpose 1
"Recall and Resignation of Directors.
Every member of the boar~ of directors of a
metropolitan water district formed hereunder
shall be subject to recall for or without cause by
the governing body of the municipality from
which such member shall be appointed, and any
member may resign from said board of directors
and any office held by him in said district."
(73-8-52, U.C.j\.. 1953, Sec. 51 of the Act of
1935.)

The ordinances which the Board of Commissioners
passed fixing the term first at six years and then at
four, were without legal effect as to that. The governing body of the municipality could have appointed a
director, saying and probably intending, for four years
and have removed him within an hour. It could have
appointed a director for six years or sixty and have
removed him within an hour. Will anyone claim or has
anyone claimed otherwise 1
It is not sure and certain that had any director of
the District been removed without cause prior to the
completion of the term fixed by the six-year or the fouryear ordinance and the removal had been questioned-
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is it not sure and certain that in such case defendants
would have been l~ere successfully citing the provisions
of U.C.A. 73-8-52 as originally written in support of
such removal, despite the Ordinances, instead of the
same being cited by us with equal confidence and consequence in support of its original clear and obvious
import and its equally clear, obvious and decisive import as amended? Ill
Regardless of what is argued, the simple fact
remains that prior to 1957 directors of plaintiff held
their offices at the will and whim of the Commission,
a the governing body of the municipality from which
such member shall be appointed."'"' The four-year and
six-year term ordinances could not rise higher than
declarations of policy. City ordinances cannot repeal
an Act of the Legislature.
The provisions of Sec. 73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953,
enacted in 1935 as Sec. 51, are not unusual. Many
officers ,both in public and private life, hold their jobs
at the will of someone, ordinarily the appointing power.
Cabinet members hold their positions at the will of
the President. Many of the officers under the state government are held at the will of the Governor, county
employees at the will of county officers making the
appointment.
The city ordinances providing from 1935 to 1941
that the term should be for six years, and from 1941 to
1957 that it should be four, could not and did not take
away the power of the governing body of the munici-
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pality to re1nove without cause; that is to say: the Legislature having expressly provided that a every member
of the board of directors of a metropolitan water district
j'orrned heretttnder shall be subject to recall for or withottd cause by the governing body of the municipality
from which such member shall be appointed/~ that was
final and conclusive as to the term to which directors
could be appointed, and was not subject to repeal or
a1nendment by a city ordinance.
The statute fixed the term then as it does now,
and no ordinance could or can enlarge or restrict it.
The governing body of the City could, of course,
decline to exercise the power granted it, and it actually
did, but it could not divest itself of the power conferred
upon it.
That the governing body of the city felt that its
ordinance of 1935, fixing the term of office of members
of the board of directors of the Metropolitan Water
District of Salt Lake City at six years was no more than
a declaration of policy and that Sec. 73-8-52 of the
statute was controlling, is clearly evinced by the fact
that in 1941 its policy was revised. On June 19 of that
year it repealed the ordinance of 1935, which provided
for a term of six years, and enacted an ordinance providing that the term of office should be four years.
Members of the District's board of directors then
in office were thus and then recalled, summarily and
without hearing, without cause, as the statute expressly
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provided they could be, and those appointed under the
ordinance of 1941 were said to be appointed for a different term-four years instead of six. It so happens
that the ordinance has not since been changed. At the
same time, it is evident that in view of the original provisions of Sec. 73-8-52 (Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935)
no ordinance at all was necessary or could be legally
effective as to the term of office. The policy of the
governing body could have been varied from time to
time as circumstances or opinion might direct. But no
ordinance, resolution or expression of intent of the city,
formal or informal, could affect the Act of the Legislature, could be as to it of any legal consequence whatever.
That the ordinances were of PRACTICAL effect
cannot be doubted. Such was their purpose.
To have passed the ordinances in question, so far
as they relate to the term of office, for any other purpose or to suppose them to be in that behalf anything
other than declarations of a policy not binding upon
the declarant or anyone else- to have passed those
ordinances for any other purpose or supposed effect
in the face of Sec. 73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 51 of the
Act of 1935, would have been utterly ridiculous, UNMITIGATED NONSENSE.
Though probably not material: Is anyone opposing
us here and now so naive as to suppose that the City
Attorney who prepared the ordinance of 1935 was
unaware of what prior to 1957 were the provisions of

10
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Sec. 73-8-52 (Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935) or that they
were unknown to him who drafted that of 1941?
"Recall and Resignation of Directors.
Every member of the board of directors of a
Inetropolitan water district formed ]lereunder
shall be subject to recall for or without cause by
the governing body of the municipality from
which such member shall be appointed, and any
member may resign from said board of directors
and any office held by him in said district."
( 73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 51 of the Act of
1935).

That language, not the ordinances_, fixed the term
of office of the members of the board of directors of the
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, and
everyone who knew anything of the subject was well
aware of it.
The Legislature of 1957, becoming aware of the
possible evil effect of ITS declaration of policy, changed
the law of the subject by deleting the words "or without", thus depriving the governing body of the municipality of power to remove a director without cause,
and re-enacted the section with that one only change:
"Recall and Resignation of Directors.
Every member of the board of directors of a
metropolitan water district formed hereunder
shall be subject to recall for ca1tse by the governing body of the municipality from which such
n1ember shall be appointed, and any member may
resign from said board of directors and any office
11
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held by him in said district." (73-8-52, U.C.A.
1953; Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935, as amended
by the Legislature of 1957) .
Theretofore appointments made to the District's
Board of Directors, as a matter of form, had been for a
term of six years from 1935 to 1941, and for a term of
four years after 1941. But the terms thus and then
declared were without legal effect. The statute ( 73-8-52,
Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935) was controlling; and thereafter the Statute was and is still controlling; with the
result that the directors appointed subsequent to 1957
hold office as the Legislature than directed.
The amendment went into effect May 14, 1957 as
Chapter 159, Laws of Utah 1957. On June 18, 1958
Mr. Charles C. Freed was appointed to serve, as the
Legislature provided, until recalled for cause.
Some do not approve of a term of office during
good behavior. Their quarrel and recourse we suggest
is with the Legislature.
At the same time it is worthy of notice and consideration that members of the board of directors of
the Metropolitan Water District are among our foremost citizens, that they serve without compensation
other than the satisfaction derived from work well done,
that their obligations have been satisfied with fidelity,
integrity and efficiency, as has been publicly acknowledged even by him whose avowed purpose is to destroy
them.

12
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Again, as to the District itself: it cannot as a matter
of law be a dum1ny of the City the boundaries of which
aie,contenninous with its own. Instead, it must be, as
the Metropolitan VVater District Act provides, "a separate and independeni political corporate entity", an
entity which, as this court declared in Lehi City v.
Meiling, reported in 87 Utah, is "an agency of the
state". That it should be so in fact as well as in legal
theory was the purpose of those responsible for the
preparation and passage of the original ordinance of
1935, a purpose which, in practical effect, as distinguished from legal, was accomplished.
It was in furtherance of such purpose in legal and
conclusive effect that the Legislature of 1957 amended
Sec. 73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953; Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935.
It may be asked why the Legislature took so long
to make the amendment in question. The answer is that
prior to 1957 it was not brought to legislative attention,
and-assuming that which we think to be absurd, that
it was aware of the actual practice-under the ordinances passed by Salt Lake City that actual practice
was not inconsistent with that which in 1957 was declared to be the policy of the Legislature concerning the
term of office of directors of metropolitan water districts. In actual practice directors were appointed and
reappointed, and none of them were ever removed from
office either with or without cause. Certainly it was
of no concern to the directors themselves that they were,
as a matter of form, appointed for definite periods of
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time, even though the statute specifically limited the
duration of their term.
Iri the statement above we have used the expression
"assuming that which we think to be absurd." We refer
to those cases which hold the Legislature is presumed
to know the fact and effect of municipal ordinances,
when there are in Utah 214 municipalities, in addition
to the 29 counties.
It seems appropriate at this point to dispose of
defendants' claim that plaintiff's interpretation of Sec.
73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953, as amended i? 1957, is inconsistent with the taxing power of the District as provided in the Metropolitan Water District Act.

POINT II
THE 1957 AMENDMENT TO SECTION
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
CONSTRUED AS PLAINTIFF CONTENDS
IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENT.
73-8-52,

This statement is the exact opposite of Point II
of Defendants' brief commencing on page 17, to which
this is our reply. Defendants' counsel devotes six pages
of the brief to this point, but our respect for counsel
is such that we feel confident that the considerations
to which we are about to advert, being called to his at-
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tention ,he would gladly erase those six pages. He states
(page 17):
"If the 1957 Amendment is construed to give
tenure during good behavior to members of an
administrative board that have authority to levy
taxes, the amendment is unconstitutional in that
it places power in a special commission to levy
taxes in violation of Article VI, Section 29 of
the Utah Constitution. The concept of imbuing
a non-representative body with taxing authority
is completely contrary to the fundamental principles of American government."
He follows this, however (page 21) with this:
"Defendants are well aware that the constitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District Act
was tested and upheld in the case of Lehi City v.
Meiling, 87 Utah, 237, 48 P.2d, 530, against the
specific contention that the district constituted
a special commission in violation of the Constitution. However, a reading of the Meiling case
indicates clearly that the court based its decision
of the fact that the Legislature had not delegated
the taxing power to this district board of directors but rather, in making the adoption of a
metropolitan water district optional within each
area to be created only upon a vote of the electorate had left the choice to the people and the
people themselves delegated the power to the
district."
Will defendants, upon reflection, still contend that
the power to dismiss directors of the Metropolitan
"\Vater District "without cause" was any protection
to the taxpayers? We think not, for quite the opposite
is at once quite apparent.

15
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Still further, defendants and their counsel apparently are not aware of those provisions of the Metropolitan Water District Act to which we are about to
refer providing adequate safeguards against an abuse
of the taxing power which if abused by the board of
directors of the district would subject them to recall
for cause.
Sec. 73-8-22, U .C.A. 1953, prohibits the incurrence
by the district of any indebtedness the payment for
which would require recourse to taxation, without submitting the proposal to incur such indebtedness to the
vote of the taxpaying electorate. For convenience we
quote from it at length:
"Whenever the board of directors of any metropolitan water district incorporat~d under this
act shall, by ordinance adopted by a vote of a
majority of the aggregate number of votes of
all the members of the board of directors, determine that the interests of said district and the
public interest or necessity demand the acquisition, construction or completion of any source
of water supply, water, waterworks or other improveinent, works or facility, or the making of
any contract with the United States or othe1·
persons or corporations, or the incurring of any
preliminary expense, necessary or convenient to
carry out the objects or purposes of said district
wherein an indebtedness or obligation shall be
created to satisfy which shall require a greater
expenditure than the ordinary annual incmne
and revenue of the district shall permit, said
board of directors may order the submission of
the proposition of incurring such obligation or
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bonded or other indebtedness, for the purposes
set forth in the said ordinance, to such qualified
electors of such district as shall have paid a property tax in the year preceding such election, at an
election held for that purpose."
Again, Sec. 73-8-31 provides:
''The board of directors shall fix such rate or
rates for the water furnished as will, in conjunction with the proceeds of the maintenance
and operation tax authorized by Section 73-1-18
( i) above, pay the operating expenses of the
district, provide for repairs and depreciation of
works owned or operated by such district, pay
the interest of any bonded or other debt, and so
far as practicable, provide a sinking or other
fund for the payment of the principal of such
debt as the same may become due; it being the
intention of this section to require the district to
pay the interest and principal of its indebtedness
from the revenues of such district, so far as
practicable."
Transgression of either of these sections of the
Act would be occasion for recall for cause.
Can it be claimed with any semblance of reason that
the deletion from 73-8-52 of the words "or without"
detracts in any sense or degree from what this court
held in Lehi City v. Meiling, supra, as set forth by
counsel for defendants?
The writer is not at all sure that this Court as such
is a ware of the fallowing:
Nevertheless, in 1937 when the District's board of
directors, after careful and exhaustive examination of
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all other possibilities, determined that its first and fundamental water supply was to be derived from the
Provo River Project of the United States Bureau of
Reclamation by a subscription to the capital stock of
Provo River ·water Users Association, it submitted
the proposal to incur the indebtedness involved to the
vote of the people; so also as to the construction of the
41-mile Salt Lake Aqueduct from the Deer Creek
Reservoir to Salt I~ake City, at the then estimated cost
of $3,534,000 as to the subscription; $5,550,000 as to
the Aqueduct; in each case reciting in the ordinance
calling the election, that the payment of the indebtedness proposed to be incurred would "require a greater
expenditure than the ordinary annual income and
revenue of the District would permit."
Again, in 1946, when the Contracts, on account
of rising costs, had to be amended to increase the cost
of the Aqueduct to $8,043,650, and of the subscription
contract to $5,301,000.
And still again, in 1958, when it was proposed to
construct the District's water treatment plant at an
estimated cost of $8,000,000.
In each instance the proposition to incur the indebtedness was submitted to vote of the people, and it would
not and could not have been incurred without their
consent. Nor can any other indebtedness requiring
recourse to taxation, that is to say, any indebtedness
"to satisfy which shall require a greater expenditure
than the ordinary annual income and revenue of the
18
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District shall permit" be incurred without the consent
of the people.
It Inay be of interest to notice that on each occasion
1nore of the electors of the District voted on the proposals than in any other special elections ever held in
Salt Lake City, and that in each case the incurrence
of the proposed indebtedness was approved almost
without dissent.
As it has turned out, Directors of the District (as
we believe this Court does know), heeding their obligation of office and the admonitions of Sec. 73-8-31,
have conducted its business with such efficiency that
no recourse to taxation, though authorized, for the
discharge of any of the indebtedness to which we have
referred, has been necessary or has been imposed, the
District never having levied a tax in excess of that for
opertaion and maintenance as that section provides.
In any event, it is clear that the legislative amendment of 1957, fixing the term of the members of the
board of directors of the district until such time as
they may be discharged for cause, not only does not
impeach but has no relation whatever to the decision
of this court in Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237,
48 P.2d 530, as accurately stated by defendants' counsel
at page 21 of their brief which we have quoted above.
It is also perfectly evident that the power of "the
governing body of the municipality" to recall members
of the district's board of directors without cause was
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fundamentally wrong and that restriction of that power
to recall only "for cause" was appropriate.
Again, from Lehi City v. Meiling, supra: It was
there held that districts formed pursuant to the Metropolitan Water District Act are not "special commissiOns, private corporations or associations."
"It is contended that the act is unconstitutional as an attempt to unlawfully delegate the
power of taxation t_o a special commission and
to interfere in city and town affairs in violation
of the provisions of Article 6, Sec. 29, which
reads as follows:
'The Legislature shall not delegate to any
special commission, private corporation or
association, any power to make, supervise or
interfere with any municipal improvement,
money, property or effects, whether held in
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a
capitol site or to perform any municipal functions.'
"This contention cannot be sustained for the
reason that the Board of Directors to whom the
manage1nent and control of the district has been
intrusted, and which is to exercise the powers
and perform the functions of the public agency
thus created, does not come within the designation 'special commission, private corporation or
association' to which the inhibitions of the section apply. City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain,
supra. Nor does the act provide for interference
with any municipal improvement, money, property, or effects. The power of control vested in
the board of directors is over the property, improveinents, money and effects of the district,
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and not that of any of the cities or towns whose
territorial boundaries may be coincidental with
that of the district or included therein. The
powers of the board are limited by the act to
the levying of taxes for the public purposes mentioned therein.
"None of the municipal functions of the component cities or towns is conferred on or delegated to the Metropolitan Water District. Each
of such cities and towns will possess and may
continue to exercise every municipal function
it now has. There need be no frictoin between
the two, but the closest cooperatoin is contemplated and should result.
"Objection is urged that the members of the
board are not elected by the electors of the district b1d are appointed by the governing authorities of the cities or towns as representatives of
such tnunicipalities. We, however, find no provision of the Constitution which limits the power
of the Legislature for the governing or control
of such public agencies by officers selected in
the manner provided rather than by election. In
the absence of constitutional provision controlling legislative action in this respect, the choice
of methods by which the governing body may
be selected is within the discretion of the Legislature. If it be objected that the Legislature in
this manner is usurping some of the powers of
local self-government, the answer is that before
a Metropolitan Water District can be organized
it must have a majority vote of the electors
within the district in support thereof and such
vote carries with it an approval of the method
by which the officers of the district shall be
selected. City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain,
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supra; Metropolitan Water District of Southern California v. Burney, supra."

As to Defendant's Argument That There Has Been a
Practical and Administrative Construction of the Metropolitan Water District Act.
Defendants stress their reliance upon what they
characterize "as a practical and administrative" construction of the Metropolitan Water District Act.
There has been none. Untill961 defendants (and their
predecessors) have acted except in 1941 as though their
ordinances were the paramount law, but the members
of the District's board of driectors, though appointed
and reappointed for stated terms without a break in the
continuity of their service, have always been well aware
of the fact that their term of office was limited by the
lVIetropolitan Water District Act, that it was at the
will of "the governing body of the municipality." They
have never assumed or asserted otherwise. There has
been "a practical administrative" construction of a legislative enactment only when its terms are susceptibl~
of different interpretations and one or the other has
been adopted and for long has met with acquiescence.
Here neither the terms or effect of the legislative enactments (73-8-52, U.C.A. 1953; Sec. 51 of the Act
of 1935) or that of 1957 are susceptible of different
interpretations, nor until the filing of defenadants'
brief has anyone questioned their objectively clear
meaning, purpose or effect. "Can anyone suggest any
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language n1ore definite and certain or more obvious to
the purpose?"
As to the Defendants' Argument That the Appointing Power May Fix the Term of Office.
They forget their stand that the Mayor alone is
vested with the power of appointment and that he has
fixed no term. Instead it is their contention that the
term has been set, not by him or by the Legislature, but
by the governing body of the municipality.

POINT III.
THE MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY IS
NOT ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OR
THE PERSON DESIGNATED AS THE APPOINTING POWER BY SECTION 73-8-20,
U.C.A. 1953.
It will be noticed that the authority granted "the
chief executive officers of municipalities" is limited by
the language "In the event that the district shall be
organized to comprise the area of two or more cities."
The last paragraph of the section reads:
"If any district shall include the area of only
one municipality then the board of directors
shall consist of such number as the governing
body of that municipality shall determine. All
provisions of this section appropriate shall apply
to such board."
23
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We suggest that it is not at all clear that "All
provisions of this section appropriate shall apply to
such board," is applicable to the power conferred upon
the chief executive officer "In the event that the district
shall be organized to comprise the area of two or more
cities."
Certainly we think the conclusion of the trial court
as to that and that the governing body is the appointing
power for a one-city district may not be lightly rejected,
especially in view of the fact that this last paragraph,
relating to a district which includes, as here, "the area
of only one municipality" expressly confers upon "the
governing body" the right to determine the number of
directors. The "chief executive officer" is not so much
as mentioned in that paragraph nor is he in any other
part of the Act, though "the governing body" frequently is.
As to the Mayor not being the "chief executive
officer" of the municipality, we base our opinion as to
that on the Statute (10-6-14, U.C.A. 1953) as heretofore eleborated:
"The executive and administrative powers,
authority and duties in such cities shall be distributed into and among five departments as follows" (enumerating them).
It is common for the Mayor to be in practical effect
the civic leader and the dominant person on the board of
commissioners, and he is as a matterof tradition and
custom the civic "greeter." But it would be easy for any-
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one familiar with local1nunicipal affairs to name mayors
who have not been leaders or dominant in any sense or
degree, and it would be easy to enumerate mayors ~ho
against their will have been assigned to one or the other
of city departments by others of the board of commissioners; but in any event there is no legal sanction in
cities of the first class for the proposition that the
Mayor is "the chief executive officer of the municipality."
It is true, as defendants claim, that the District's
board of directors have made no objection to the usurpation by the Mayor of the sole power of nomination to
the District's board, nor to the terms of fixed duration.
But it was of no concern to the District or its board
of directors that other members of the board of commissioners might or might not have surrendered exercise of their prerogatives to one of their number, or in
view of the provisions of Sec. 73-8-52 that the term of
office was stated to be such as violated the provisiOns
of that section.
Appointments having as a matter of form been
made for terms of definite duration, the Board certainly
had no cause for complaint, because those terms were
for a greater period of time than that fixed by the
statute, and so as a practical matter afforded them some
small measure of security to which they were entitled.
It may be noted~ however~ that Sec. 73-8-52 having
been amended~ as the Legislature of 1957 did~ that as
soon as an attempt was made to limit the term for a
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tirne less or different than that fixed by the .statute~ this
action was immediately filed.

It would be supererogatory, perhaps even offensive,
to cite authority to the effect that it is not the function
of the Court to pass upon the wisdom of legislation,
and certainly it does not devolve upon counsel to do so.
The Metropolitan Water District Act, taken from
that under which was organized the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California, including the area of
upwards of fifty cities and towns, is not perfectly appropriate to local conditions, and especially not to a
district embracing the area of only one municipality.
The very section, U.C.A. 73-8-52 (Sec. 51 of the Act
of 1935) upon which we rely, as it was originally enacted
by the Legislature, was and always has been repugnant
to the ideas and purposes of those active and responsible for the creation of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, but it is and was, as originally
written, as well as amended in 1957, controlling and
decisive of this controversy.
In Southern California it was of no practical significance because the arbitrary removal "for or without
cause" of those directors from Azusa, Anaheim or Burbank would not impeach the integrity of the board of
directors itself. Nevertheless, Sec. 73-8-52, U.C.A.
1953 (Sec. 51 of the Act of 1935) was "the law of the
land" until 1957.
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The ordinances of 1935 and 1941 sought to alleviate
1n practical effect the possible consequence of that
section as originally enacted, and in practical effect they
have alleviated it. They could not, however, affect its
clear and obvious legal consequence; but the Legislature
could and did~ by the amendment of that section of the
Metropolitan Water District Act in 1957, with the
obvious objective purpose and conclusive effect of obviating the possibility of those acts the occasion of this
litigation-the arbitrary and capricious removal of a
director of experience, outstanding merit and proven
worth, without cause, without reason, or excuse. The
result is inevitable, that when the appointment of the
defendant Isaacson was sought in June of 1961 there
was no vacancy on the District's board of directors.

POINT IV.
THE APPOINTMENT OF ISAACSON IS
INVALID.
In their Point III defendants take the position
that the ordinances of 193.5 and 1941 must be all good
or all bad. This contention is absurd.
The governing body of Salt Lake City has express
authority to fix the number of directors to sit and hold
office on plaintiff's board. The ordinances were passed
fixing the number. There is no reason in the world why
this provision of the ordinances should not be held valid.
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The contention of plaintiff is that neither the governing body of the municipality nor anyone else had
the power to fix the term of office since it had already
been fixed by the statute and for the further reason
that to have permitted the fixing of a term would eliminate the power granted by the Legislature to remove at
any time without cause. This was changed by the Legislature of 1957 so that the powers of removal can, as to
appointments since made, only be based upon cause.
To permit the removal of a director by fixing a term
would result in removal without cause.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the
trial court refusing to recognize the validity of Isaacson's appointment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FISHER HARRIS
E. RAY CHRISTENSEN
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS
Attorneys for Respondent
and Cross-Appellant
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